to treat Taliban and al Qaeda detainees as prisoners of war subject to protection under the Geneva Convention., This paper outlines the legal case for denying Geneva Convention protection to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees. It explains why the United States concluded that members of the al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban militia are illegal combatants under the laws of war, and so cannot claim the legal protections and benefits that accrue to legal belligerents, such as prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention.
This conclusion has several important consequences. First, from the perspective of U.S. national security, the Geneva Convention presents substantial obstacles to the effective acquisition of intelligence from the interrogation of detainees. Article 17 of the Convention provides that "[e]ver prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.... Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." Interrogation methods routinely used at American police stations frequently include offers of leniency and special benefits for cooperating individuals. Article 17's prohibition on "disadvantageous treatment" means that prisoners of war are given even better treatment than that afforded to criminal suspects under U.S. law. In addition, the Geneva Convention provides a number of human comforts not guaranteed to criminal suspects under U.S. law. All humans are entitled to food, water, and basic shelter. Yet under Article 26, prisoners "shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals . . . they shall be given the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession." Article 26 also provides for the "use of tobacco." Article 38 guarantees access to "intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports and games," and the detaining power must "take the measures necessary" to "provid[e] them with adequate premises and necessar equipment." Detainees Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke and Major General Stanley A. McChg stal, Mar. 24, 2003 , available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/ t03242003_r0324asd.hrml (Clarke: "We are treating all of the [Iraqi] POWs in accordance with the Geneva Conventions"); see also Douglas J. Feith, Conventional Warfare, Wall St. J., May 24, 2004, at A14 ("As to Iraq, the U.S. government has recognized from the outset that the Geneva Conventions apply by law and all Iraqi detainees are covered by them. All Iraqi militay detainees have had POW status. As we all know from the horrible photos, some detainees in Iraq have been abused, but that mistreatment violated the Defense Department's policy as promulgated by the secretary."); Alberto Gozales, Terrorists Are Different, http://www.usatoday.com/ news/ opinion/ editorials/ 2004 06 09 oppose-x.htm. (Feb. 8, 2002) . must be given "opportunities for taking physical exercise including sports and games and for being out of doors," and " [s] ufficient open space" must be provided for those purposes.
These rights are designed for professional soldiers who are duty-bound to fight for their nation-not for criminals, and certainly not for terrorists. Indeed, prisoners of war are also entitled to "working pay" (Article 54) and "a monthly advance of pay" (Article 60), as befitting professional soldiers captured in the line of dut. Not only are prisoners of war entitled to receive "relief shipments" from outsiders, those shipments are "exempt from import, customs and other dues" (Article 74).
The conclusion that unlawful combatants, including terrorist organizations and organizations that harbor them, are not subject to Geneva Convention protection also has other important consequences besides national security and the collection of life-saving military intelligence. The effective enforcement of international law, including the laws of war, requires the existence of incentives for compliance and disincentives for noncompliance. That includes prisoner of war protection for compliance with the laws of war, and denial of such protection to unlawful combatants. As Allan Rosas explained in his renowned 1976 treatise, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War A Stud' in International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, "the only effective sanction against perfidious attacks in civilian dress is deprivation of prisoner-of-war status."7 That is precisely why the Geneva Conventions extend prisoner of war protections only to lawful combatants. Indeed, as I explain below, President Ronald Reagan, supported by the State Department, refused to support the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, specifically because that protocol was designed to do what the 1949 Convention did not-namely, extend rights and protections to unlawful combatants.
I.
Members of al Qaeda and the Taliban militia are not legally entitled to the batter of special rights and protections designed for professional soldiers.
As a threshold matter, al Qaeda is not even a nation-state, and as such cannot be a state party to the Geneva Conventions. Even if al Qaeda were capable of becoming a party to the treaties, it has not done so, nor has it ever declared an intention to accept their terms. Naturally, al Qaeda members cannot claim the benefits of a treaty to which their organization is not a party.
Those threshold issues aside, al Qaeda members fall within the category of what are known as illegal combatants. Although the term "illegal combatant" is not expressly mentioned in the Geneva Conventions, it is a concept that has long been recognized by state practice in the law of war area. As the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously stated over 60 years ago, " [b] y universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants."s These two sets of distinctions each play a critical role in achieving the fundamental objective of the laws of war: to minimize the amount of human suffering and hardship necessitated by a state of war.
9
The customaw laws of war minimize human suffering in wartime by limiting the suffering and hardship of war, to the maximum extent possible, to the participating combatants, and by keeping militar hostilities away from civilians. This approach naturally requires the effective enforcement of a sharp distinction between civilians and combatants. Accordingly, customar law demands that combatants respect the distinction between civilians and themselves by imposing a variety of prohibitions and requirements. Customar law forbids the intentional targeting of civilians,1 and encourages combatants to take measures to avoid unnecessary harm to civilians in their own mihtary operations." Customars law Rep. 470, 483 (1971) ("Immunity of non-combatants from direct attack is one of the basic rules of the international law of war."). 11 See, e.g., Lieber Code art. 19 ("Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences."); id., art. 22 ("The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed also requires combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population in order to help enemy soldiers avoid doing harm to civilians.12 Naturally, in return for these various protections from hostilities, civilians are strictly forbidden under customary law from engaging in hostilities. The former cannot exist without the latter; combatants cannot fairly be told to refrain from using force against civilians if they regularly suffer attacks from such groups. Al Qaeda violates the ver core of the laws of war. Al Qaeda members are not under the control of a nation-state that will force them to obey the laws of war. They operate covertly by intentionally concealing themselves among the civilian population; they deliberately attempt to blur the lines between civilians and combatants. Most importantly, they have attacked purely civilian targets with the aim of inflicting massive civilian casualties. Thus, even if al Qaeda were a nation-state and a party to the Geneva Conventions, its members would still quaiy as illegal belligerents due to their very conduct.
Unlike al Qaeda, the Taliban militia arguably constituted the de facto government troops of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a party to the Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, the Taliban militia, like al Qaeda, by their conduct did not meet the standards for legal belligerency that would have made its members legally entitled to prisoner of war status.
GPW entitles captured members of regular and irregular armed forces to the status of, and legal protections enjoyed by, POW s if they belong to units that meet the requirements of one of several applicable categories. GPW protections are available for members of militia under certain conditions. Article 4(A)(1) extends POW status to "members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of' the "armed forces of a Party to the conflict."' 13 Article 4(A)(2) extends GPW protections to
[m]embers of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is citizen is to be spared in person, property' and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit."); id., art. 23 ("the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war"); id., art. 25 ("protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule").
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See, e.g., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 August , at 527 (1987 ("1977 Protocols Commentar") (noting "the fundamental rule that combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a nilitar 3 operation preparatory to an attack"); R.C. Hingorani, Prisoners of War 48 (1982) ("It is one of the basic features of the laws of war that the combatants should be distinguished from non-combatants.").
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
14 At best, it appears that Taliban fighters are members of a militia. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, has recognized that Afghanistan has no national militar, but rather a number of tribal militias factionalized among various groups5 Thus, because members of the Taliban militia, like members of al Qaeda, do not comply with the four conditions of lawful combat expressly incorporated into article 4(A)(2) of GPW, they are not entitled to the protections of that convention.
Even if the Taliban were able to claim status as a "regular armed forceH," rather than as a militia, it still could not qualify for POV status under GPW article 4(A)(1) or (3) It has long been understood, however, that regular, professional "armed forces" must comply with the four traditional conditions of lawful combat under the customary laws of war, and that the terms of article 4(A)(1) and (3) The four conditions under customary law play an essential role in enforcing the fundamental distinction between civilians and combatants. The second and third conditions are practical provisions to help soldiers recognize the distinction between members of enemy forces and civilians during the conduct of military operations.21
The first and fourth conditions help ensure that the substantive rules of conduct respecting this fundamental distinction, such as the prohibition on targeting of civilians and the requirement of distinguishing oneself as a combatant, are effectively enforced.22
Taken together, these four conditions, aimed at facilitating the bedrock customary distinction between combatants and civilians, also establish a second 30 It has been contended by some that unlawful combatants, if not protected under GPW, are entitled to the rights guaranteed under GC, even though the very title of that convention indicates that it protects only "civilians." I find this contention absurd; taken to its logical conclusion, it would actually forbid lawful combatants, for example, from conducting nilitary hostilities against unlawful combatants, pursuant to the requirements of GC article 27, which forbids "all acts of violence or threats thereof' against persons covered by GC, whether or not they are held in custody.
conditions of lawful combat as a condition of their status as legitimate belligerents entitled to engage in war on behalf of their sovereign. When various efforts were initiated, beginning in 1874, to codifv customary law into written form, drafters saw no need to enumerate the four conditions with respect to regular, professional armies; those were already provided for under customar law. Explicit reference to the four conditions was necessary only in order to achieve certain innovations in the laws of war: namely, to extend the rights and duties of lawful combatants beyond fighters in regular armies, to include members of militia, volunteer corps, and other irregular forces. See, e.g., Mallison & Mallison, 9 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. at 44 ("The new juridical concept is the provision which applies the same rights and obligations to nilitia and volunteers if they comply with the specified four conditions").
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The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on March 14, 1902 . See 35 Cong. Rec. 2792 (1902 . The President soon ratified the convention on March 19, 32 Stat. 1803, and proclaimed the convention on April 11, 32 Stat. 1826. the Treatment of Prisoners of War ("1929 GPW")34 itself did not articulate the four conditions. It instead incorporated by reference the categories of protected persons contained in article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention Annex35 Thus, like the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1929 GPW did not explicitly require armies to comply with the four traditional conditions of lawful combat. Once again, however, there was no indication that the drafters intended to abrogate customary law, under which armies had long been required to meet those conditions. To the contrar, all of these agreements tracked closely article 9 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration. As previously noted, article 9 was well understood to maintain the customary rule that regular armies must comply with the four conditions of lawful combat, even though that article did not explicitly say so. That same customar rule was also preserved in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1929 GPW.
Many provisions of GPWV were drafted to provide more generous rights and protections to POWs than those afforded under earlier conventions governing the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners of war. But there is no indication that the drafters intended GPW to abrogate the customary rule that regular armies must satisfy the four traditional conditions of lawful combat in order to enjoy the protections afforded by the laws of war. To the contrary, article 4 of GPW, governing eligibility for international legal protection, was drafted "in harmony" with customary legal principles embodied in the Hague Regulations, not to rescind or abrogate them.36
The drafters of GPW held two basic understandings in common with their predecessors. First, under customary law, organized armed forces were already required to satisfy the four conditions of lawful combat. There was accordingly no need for article 4 to apply those conditions explicitly to such regular forces.
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By contrast, there was a perceived need to continue to state expressly that irregular forces must comply with those conditions to trigger the protections afforded to POWs, as was stated in earlier codifications of the laws of war. The drafters of GPW thus explicitly enumerated the four conditions of lawful combat only in the text of article 4(A)(2), using language virtually identical to that of the Hague Regulations.
3 t The provisions of GPX respecting the legal status of legitimate combatants thus track closely those of its predecessors. As previously explained, article 4(A)(2) expressly enumerates the four conditions with respect to irregular forces, such as militias and volunteers corps, not forming a part of a regular armed force of a party.39 Those four conditions do not appear, by contrast, in either article 4(A)(1) or (3), the provisions governing regular armed forces.4 0 However, like the Brussels Declaration, the two Hague Conventions, and the 1929 GPW, there is no indication that article 4 of GPWV was drafted to abrogate the long established customary rule that regular forces by definition must comply with the four conditions to enjoy the legal status of legitimate combatants under the laws of war.
II. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a militar operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a) during each military engagement, and (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
Subsequent international developments respecting the Geneva Conventions
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The Reagan Administration opposed this provision and refused to submit the first protocol to the Senate for its consideration, precisely because it opposed the idea of diluting the customary rule that combatants must comply with all four traditional conditions of lawful combatantcy. As he explained to the Senate, President Reagan opposed Protocol I, in part, because it would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfV the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves. These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot be remedied through reservations, and I therefore have decided not to submit the Protocol to the Senate in am form ....
[W]e must not, and need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law. The State Department likewise opposed ratification of Protocol I, noting that Article 44(3), in a single subordinate clause, sweeps away years of law by "recognizing" that an armed irregular "cannot" always distinguish himself from non-combatants; it would grant combatant status to such an irregular anyway. As the essence of terrorist criminality is the obliteration of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, it would be hard to square ratification of this Protocol with the United States' announced poicy of combatting [sic] terrorism. Article 44 of Protocol I .. .allows irregular fighters to retain combatant and POV rights even though they do not comply with the traditional requirement of distinguishing themselves from the civilian population by carrying their arms openly and wearing some distinctive sign. (The only exception would be during attacks and military operations preparator to an attack.) This provision would make it easier for irregulars to operate, and it would substantially increase the risks to the civilian population. Inevitably, regular forces would treat civilians more harshly and with less restraint if they believed that their opponents were free to pose as civilians while retaining their right to act as combatants and their POW status if captured. Innocent civilians would therefore be made more vulnerable by application of the Protocol. This is no advance for humanitarian law.
In addition, the Protocol eliminates one of the basic existing requirements that irregular groups must meet to qualify for combatant and POW status: that the group as such generally conduct its operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Instead, Protocol I provides that individual members of such groups must be accorded POW benefits (with ver limited exceptions) even if the group as such (e.g., the PLO) displays a callous and systematic disregard for the law. This means in effect that liberation groups can enjoy many of the benefits of the law of war without fulfilling its duties, and with the confidence that the belligerent state has no real remedy under the Protocol to deal with this matter. The specific grounds of opposition to article 44(3) of Protocol I by the United States thus further demonstrate that, under GPV, all combatants must comply with the four conditions expressly enumerated in article 4(A)(2) in order to enjoy the Convention's protections. This is not the place to discuss whether the United States had the factual basis upon which to decide whether the Taliban militia actually met the four criteria for legal belligerency. It is enough at this point to conclude that President Bush had the legal basis to conclude that the Taliban militia had to meet those four criteria in order to be legally entitled to the status of legal belligerency, and, as a result, the protections accorded to prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.
There are important distinctions between prisoners of war and terrorists. It is because professional soldiers comply with the laws of war, and are members of fighting units with organizational hierarchies and disciplinary systems that are designed to enforce such compliance, that they are entitled to the rights and protections of prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. And it is . See also Rosas, n. 7 above, at 327 ("draft Protocol I submitted by the ICRC . . .is an attempt to loosen the four classical conditions").
